high speed railway contractor consortium

HighSpeed Rail Siemens Mobility Vectron Locomotives Velaro Suppliers Siemens Mobility A consortium made up of Siemens Mobility, Orascom Construction and The Arab Contractors has signed a contract with the Egyptian National Authority for Tunnels (NAT) to design, install and commission a 1,800 kilometre high-speed rail network in Egypt. HighSpeed Railway Contractor Consortium - HSRCC, Jakarta, Indonesia. Interest Newjobs for high speed railway contractor consortium 13 in Indonesia available today on JobStreet - Quality Candidates, Quality Employers Lowongankerja High Speed Railway Contractor Consortium Indonesia Saring. Kembali. Nama pekerjaan. Di mana. Cari lowongan. Kembali Filter Hapus. Sortir berdasarkan Relevansi Tanggal Tipe pekerjaan Semua tipe Purna Waktu Tanggal ditayangkan Kapan saja 30 hari terakhir. Jarak. 10km. Cari. Lamar sekarang. HighSpeed Railway Contractor Consortium (CRSC) Bekasi . Ditayangkan 12 Oktober 2021 . Deskripsi Pekerjaan . Job Description: Arranging logistics and preparing administrative arrangements for activities such as flights, hotels, meeting rooms, transportation, and related arrangements Site De Rencontre Femme Et Homme. This article has been translated by PwC Indonesia as part of our Indonesia Infrastructure News Service. PwC Indonesia has not checked the accuracy of, and accepts no responsibility for the content. Investor Daily - Dukungan untuk Wika di proyek kereta cepat 27 October 2021 By Parluhutan Situmorang The government’s decision to finance Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway is positively supporting PT Wijaya Karya Tbk WIKA. The company is also supported by the domestic construction segment that is starting to recover. Wika’s decision to delay the IPO of their two subsidiaries, PT Wika Realty and PT Wika Rekayasa Konstruksi, to 2023 is reckoned to be the right decision by analysts. Moreover, the corporate action aims to secure funds of around Rp3 trillion to Rp4 trillion. BRI Danareksa Sekuritas analyst, Maria Renata, revealed that the government had issued Presidential Regulation Number 93 of 2021, which allowed the government to fund Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway project. “The involvement of the government in financing the project can impact the shareholding of consortium members, including Wika’s shareholding that can also be diluted after the appointment of PT KAI as the consortium leader,” she wrote in her research. According to Maria, the government has also assigned Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs and Investment, Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan, to directly supervise the high-speed railway project. “With the appointment and the funding, the construction of the high-speed railway is expected to be progress more quickly, which will positively impact Wika,” she explained. Besides that, Wika will secure a contract worth trillion to construct the project, which is 30% of the total contract. The rest will be divided among 6 to 7 contractors from China. Wika has invested trillion as equity in the project and provided a shareholder loan of trillion. The project construction progress has reached and the construction progress carried out by WIka has reached 82%. The project is set to be finished by the middle of 2022 and to operate by the end of 2022. “KCIC is currently officially calculating the additional cost and [devising] a way to finance the project. Until now, around 75% of the project is financed from loans, which are predicted to increase in line with the investment value increase,” Maria revealed. Those factors are encouraging BRI Danareksa Sekuritas to maintain their buy recommendation for WIKA shares with a target price of Rp1,400. Positive sentiment of the company’s shares came from the government support in the construction Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Railway project and the potential of less company shares in the project. Moreover, Wika’s net profit this year is predicted to increase to Rp274 billion from Rp186 billion last year. The company’s revenue is also predicted to grow from trillion to trillion. Meanwhile, their profit per share is predicted to increase from billion to billion. Meanwhile, Samuel Sekuritas Indonesia analyst, Andreas Kristo Saragih, revealed that Wika’s financial performance would improve in the next three years. This expectation is supported by the double-digit growth of new contracts and the gradual increase of the burn rate. “We also have positive perspective towards Wika thanks to the government’s involvement in resolving the cost overrun issue in the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway project, the loss at the early stage of the high-speed railway’s operation, and the project owner’s decision to delay spending,” Andreas wrote in his research. Regarding new contracts, Wika’s compound annual growth rate CAGR can reach until 2023. The increase will be supported by new contracts from SOEs State-owned Enterprises such as Pertamina, Pelindo, PLN and Angkasa Pura that are once again allocating their capital expenditure in activities that are Wika’s specialties. “We also estimate that several new contracts from 2022 to 2023 will come from infrastructure projects in the Capital city,” he explained. Wika will also be supported by their capability to secure additional contracts worth Rp15 trillion in the fourth quarter of 2021. That amount considers the value of tenders that the company are participating in that reaches Rp24 trillion and the estimated value of tenders that will be released by the government and SOEs in the fourth quarter of 2021 that reaches around Rp15 trillion to Rp20 trillion. Several project tenders that Wika are participating in are toll road, smelter, building, dam, and irrigation construction projects. Samuel Sekuritas recommends buying WIKA shares with a target price of Rp1,440. That target price reflects an estimated PE ratio of in 2022. That target price also shows slow financial performance improvement in the next few years until it matches the realisation in the last few years. Rete Ferroviaria Italiana RFI and the Iricav 2 consortium led by the Webuild Group, have signed a EUR billion contract for the construction of the first section of Verona-Padua high speed line. The consortium comprises Webuild with a stake, Astaldi – and Hitachi Rail with a share of Under the contract, the consortium will be responsible for the construction of km high-speed rail section between Verona and Bivio Vicenza, crossing 13 municipalities, of which six in Verona province and seven in Vicenza. km of viaducts, km tunnels and 33 km elevations will be constructed as part of this first lot. The section, which will comprise a total investment of EUR billion, is expected to be completed in 2027. EUR 874 million is the awarded funding for the first phase as part of the contract, while the remaining EUR billion will be financed within the next 12 months. By quadrupling the existing railway, it will improve the quality of the train service and strengthen its links to a European network, helping reduce the impact on the environment as well as the number of road accidents. “We are very happy to start a new strategic project, this time for mobility in Veneto. It is another piece of infrastructure that we hope will involve a long supply chain, running from north to south,” Webuild Chief Executive Pietro Salini said. EUR billion is the needed investment for the construction of entire km high-speed line, of which EUR billion is the value available for the general contractor. The railway line will be constructed within two more lots. This involves a km section crossing of Vicenza as the second lot, and the Vicenza-Padua section which will have a length of km. The Verona-Padua high speed line is an important railway connection across the country’s northeast. Is part of the Milan-Venice high-speed connection, on the Mediterranean Corridor, the main east-west axis in the TEN-T Network south of the Alps, running from south-western Mediterranean region of Spain to the Ukrainian border. With the addition of the line between Milan and Venice to the national network, 75% of the Italian population will have access to high-speed rail service. To develop the high-speed railway network, RFI has also awarded this year, a contract for the second lot of Brescia Est – Verona line. Share on Basic Information Name Jakarta–Bandung High-Speed RailwayLocation Jakarta to Bandung, West Java Province, IndonesiaType of Project TransportationProject Developers PT Kereta Cepat Indonesia China KCIC, a 60–40 joint venture between a consortium of Indonesian state-owned enterprises SOEs through PT Pilar Sinergi BUMN PSBI and a consortium of Chinese SOEs through Beijing Yawan HSR Co. Ltd. PSBI comprises PT Wijaya Karya, PT Perkebunan Nusantara VIII, PT Kereta Api Indonesia, and PT Jasa Yawan HSR comprises China Railway International Co. Ltd a subsidiary of China State Railway Group Co. Ltd, CR, China Railway Group Limited known as CREC, Sinohydro Corporation Limited a subsidiary of Power Construction Corporation of China, CRRC Corporation Limited CRRC, and China Railway Signal and Communication Corporation CRSC. Main Contractors High-Speed Railway Contractor Consortium HSRCC, a consortium between Indonesian company PT Wijaya Karya 30% and several Chinese companies 70%, including China Railway International Co. Ltd, CREC, Sinohydro Corporation Limited, China Railway Design Corporation another subsidiary of CR, CRRC Sifang Co. Ltd a subsidiary of CRRC, and Financiers China Development BankCost billion USD estimate as of 2021, from an initial estimate of billion USDProject Status Under construction Project Outline The idea of a fast train project in Indonesia dates back to 2011, when the Japanese International Cooperation Agency JICA together with the Indonesian Ministry of National Development Planning Bappenas carried out a feasibility study for a possible Jakarta–Surabaya HSR, the first phase of which would connect Jakarta to Bandung. The Jakarta–Surabaya medium–high-speed railway was listed as a priority project in 2013. The original plan did not explicitly mention the Jakarta–Bandung HSR, but it suggested the Jakarta–Cirebon route via Bandung section would be prioritised in part due to its higher economic internal rate of return. However, when President Joko Widodo Jokowi came to power in 2014, he shelved the plan to build the railway and reallocated the budget to development projects outside Java. Much to the surprise of everyone, not least the Japanese, in March 2015, Jokowi asked both Japan and China to bid for the Jakarta–Bandung section of the railway. In September 2015, both countries presented their proposals, which were relatively balanced. The Japanese proposed five stations along a 140-kilometre track that is part of the Jakarta–Cirebon route, while the Chinese side planned eight stations along a 150-kilometre track. Though China had a higher interest rate of 2% compared with Japan’s China offered a longer maturity period for the loan 50 years as opposed to 40 years, a shorter time frame for completion of the project, and waived the state guarantee. After a fierce bidding war between China and Japan over the project, which China won, Indonesian Minister of State-Owned Enterprises Rini Soemarno was given a mandate to determine the fate of the railway, including the establishment of the joint-venture company to lead the project. In September 2015, a state-owned fast train consortium was formed, named PT Indonesia China Fast Train or Kereta Cepat Indonesia China, KCIC. KCIC is a consortium of Indonesian and Chinese SOEs. Indonesia is represented by PT Pilar Sinergi BUMN Indonesia PSBI, a consortium of four SOEs—namely, PT Wijaya Karya 38%, active in construction, PT Jasa Marga 12%, toll road builder, PT Kereta Api Indonesia 25%, railways, and PT Perkebunan Nusantara VIII 25%, plantations. Meanwhile, the Chinese side is represented by a consortium led by Beijing Yawan HSR Co. Ltd, which comprises China Railway International Co. Ltd, CREC, Sinohydro Corporation Limited a subsidiary of Power Construction Corporation of China, China Railway Design Corporation, CRRC Corporation Limited, and China Railway Signal & Communication Corporation. The initial deal included debt financing from the China Development Bank CDB—for 75% of the total billion USD cost—which was granted with a 10-year grace period and a 2% interest rate for the dollar-denominated loan. The remaining 25% of the project’s cost will be funded by equity provided by KCIC. After the establishment of KCIC, the railway route was revised. The train was expected to reduce the 142-kilometre trip between Jakarta and Bandung from three hours to less than 40 minutes, with a maximum speed of 350 km/h. Four main stations are planned along the route Halim East Jakarta, Karawang West Java, Walini West Java, and Tegalluar West Java. Project Developer Project Contractor Soon after the establishment of KCIC, the ground-breaking ceremony for the Jakarta–Bandung HSR was held in Walini, West Java Province, in the presence of President Jokowi, on 21 January 2016. However, the project was already embroiled in controversy, with critics expressing concerns over the risk of default and the irregularities in the concession of the building permit. Then Transport Minister Ignasius Jonan did not attend the ceremony, and instead became one of the staunchest critics of the project. On 26 January, Jonan revealed that he had not issued the railway infrastructure operation permit as his ministry was still waiting for the required documents and negotiating basic terms for the concession agreement with KCIC. Despite the lack of permits and support from key ministries and lawmakers, in late January 2016, Jokowi issued a regulation containing a list of about 200 strategic projects including the HSR, signalling the strong backing of and attention from his office for this project. Many pundits believe that by backing the project, Jokowi was attempting to build his political legitimacy, with the project connecting the two largest metropolitan areas and located in the most populated province in Indonesia, cementing Jokowi’s claim to be the country’s Infrastructure Father’. From this point of view, China’s initial commitment to complete the project before 2019 was critical to Jokowi’s government as it provided the president with political capital for his campaign for re-election that year. After several delays, including a stoppage owing to the COVID-19 pandemic, construction of the railway fell way behind schedule. As of December 2020, the project was said to be 64% complete. In April 2021, Indonesian media quoted senior management at KCIC as saying the project would be operational by the end of 2022. In May 2021, President Jokowi inspected the project during his visit to West Java Province and announced the project was 73% complete, with trial runs expected to commence at the end of 2022. Source Drawn by the author. Project Impacts Land The delay in loan disbursement was one of the main factors that impeded construction of the HSR from 2016 to 2018, due to inadequate preparation in the land acquisition According to local nongovernmental organisation NGO Indonesian Forum for the Environment Walhi, project construction has caused flooded roads, landslides, and damaged houses in part due to shoddy management and poor environmental protection procedures. As the planned route of the railway cuts through important water catchment areas, mountainous regions, and agricultural areas, the project has also impacted water supplies and caused environmental stress to the surrounding impact Due to poor preparation and multiple technical challenges, the project has incurred cost overruns. In 2017, the budget swelled from billion USD to billion USD. Economists and policymakers have questioned the viability of the project, worrying it will drag Indonesia into a debt trap. Employment and labour rights The project was expected to create 39,000 jobs—both casual and permanent—during its three-year construction phase, but no data are available to show whether this promise has been fulfilled. Meanwhile, for its operation, KCIC is set to offer 2,400 local jobs and the recruitment process was under way as of April 2021. The Jakarta–Bandung HSR has led to various concerns regarding the financial sustainability of the KCIC and Indonesian SOEs in general. With Indonesian finance accounting for a major share of total investment in the project 60%, economists and policymakers voiced concerns about whether the country was at high risk of falling into debt distress. This was especially so because the Indonesian SOEs joining the consortium are debt-heavy entities and, before the inception of KCIC, were already struggling to meet their repayment obligations. To develop these major projects, the SOEs are frontloaded with debt and will only get cash flow back years into the future, which is why delays are so costly. Some Members of Parliament called on the government to halt the project amid increased concerns that a bailout would be necessary should KCIC default on its debt. In particular, Prabowo Subianto, a challenger to Jokowi’s presidency during the 2019 general election, built his campaign on the claim that Indonesia’s economic shortfalls were due to Chinese exploitation, and he even staged a protest against the HSR. As part of the campaign, Prabowo’s team promised to renegotiate—if not cancel—the project, claiming that Indonesia must get a better deal’, given that Chinese investment had eroded national interests. During the COVID-19 pandemic, pundits and the media regularly questioned the project’s sustainability. In June 2020, the Jokowi government began discussions with Japan to join the project and suggested integrating the Chinese-built HSR with a separate Japanese-funded railway project linking Jakarta and Surabaya along a different route. Some in the Indonesian Government argued that only by integrating the two projects could they both become economically viable. However, integration would be difficult as the Japanese-built section uses a different railway gauge and speeds. The restructuring of KCIC management and the appointment of a new chief executive in March 2021 have been interpreted as clear signs of the worsening financial outlook for the company. Adding to this, the following month, Indonesian SOEs also suggested that China take up a larger stake in the project to bear the cost overrun. This remains unresolved and, according to the corporate secretary of KCIC, who was quoted by Reuters in April 2021 Until now, details regarding additional unexpected costs are still being discussed and negotiated at the shareholder level. Also, consultations between the Government of Indonesia and China are continuing.’ According to an interview conducted by the author with one human resources manager, KCIC has employed a majority of local staff in the construction of the project, but top-level management is mostly dominated by Chinese expatriates, despite the fact the Indonesian side has a 60% share in the consortium. KCIC also claimed it has provided vocational training for domestic staff and local engineers to become the first HSR technicians’ in Southeast Asia. While generating more than 2,400 job opportunities, the project has faced multiple problems and technical challenges in its construction phase. In April 2016, vendors tasked by KCIC to carry out land investigations—including five Chinese nationals—were detained by the Indonesian Air Force for trespassing at the Halim Perdanakusuma Airport. In October 2019, a construction mishap caused Indonesia’s state-owned Pertamina oil pipeline to erupt in flames. In January 2020, the breach of an embankment allegedly caused by KCIC led to flooding in the West Bandung Regency. In March 2020, flooding caused by improper landfill and waste dumping blocked the Jakarta–Cikampek toll road, which is one of the busiest routes in the greater Jakarta region. These incidents have sparked public suspicion about the quality of the project’s technical assessment, given the environmental impact assessment AMDAL was completed in just seven days before the ground-breaking ceremony, according to NGO Walhi, which has been questioning the AMDAL submitted by KCIC since early 2016. Following the recent construction mishaps and environmental degradation caused by the project, Walhi staged a series of protests demanding the Indonesian Government and KCIC reassess the project, but they have been met with no response. The project continues without any further information being made public about plans to revisit the AMDAL or actions to minimise the risks. The land acquisition process has been no less problematic. Although KCIC secured a concession for the project in April 2016, progress was slow in the first two years. The inadequate preparation of land acquisition procedures and the involvement of ill-informed Chinese companies that overlooked the complexity of landownership in Indonesia have led to many controversies. There was a tendency on the part of the Chinese companies to assume public ownership of all land, as is the case in China. Moreover, the CDB made funding conditional on Indonesia securing all the land needed for the railway, making the delay even more challenging. Acquisition of land for the project finally reached 99% in late 2019, after the Indonesian Government intervened in the process. In-Depth Sources Belt and Road Podcast. 2021. Easy Money is Rarely Easy Jessica Liao on Infrastructure Financing and Export Credit Agencies.’ Belt and Road Podcast, 21 January. Link. Camba, Alvin. 2020. Derailing development China’s railway projects and financing coalitions in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. GCI Working Paper 008. Global Development Policy Center, Boston University. Link. Friends of the Earth US. 2017. Investing in a Green Belt and Road? Assessing the Implementation of China’s Green Credit Guidelines Abroad. Washington, DC Friends of the Earth US. Link in English; Link in Chinese. Liao, Jessica C. 2020. Easy Money and Political Opportunism How China and Japan’s High-Speed Rail Competition in Indonesia Drives Financially Risky Projects.’ Panda Paw Dragon Claw, 21 December. Link. Liao, Jessica C. and Saori N. Katada. 2020. Geoeconomics, Easy Money, and Political Opportunism The Perils under China and Japan’s High-Speed Rail Competition.’ Contemporary Politics 271 1–22. Lim, Guanie, Chen Li, and Emirza Adi Syailendra. 2021. Why Is It So Hard to Push Chinese Railway Projects in Southeast Asia? The Role of Domestic Politics in Malaysia and Indonesia.’ World Development 138. Link. Salim, Wilmar and Siwage Dharma Negara. 2016. Why is the high speed rail project so important to Indonesia? ISEAS PerspectiveNo. 16. Singapore ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute. Link. Tritto, Angela. 2020. Contentious Embeddedness Chinese State Capital and the Belt and Road Initiative in Indonesia.’ Made in China Journal 51 182–87. Featured Image Credits muhammadpascalfajrin CC, on A high-speed train carries out a test run on the Jakarta-Bandung line in Tegalluar, Indonesia’s West Java province, last month. The railway had planned to begin a free trial with passengers in mid-August, but this could now be pushed back. Photo Antara Foto/Raisan Al Farisi via Reuters The 142km Jakarta-Bandung line, a high-profile belt and road project, is already US$ billion over its initial budget and four years behind schedule Indonesia’s transport ministry is now calling for the proposed commercial launch of the rail line to be pushed back from August this year to January Published 303pm, 7 Jun, 2023 Updated 312pm, 7 Jun, 2023 A high-speed train carries out a test run on the Jakarta-Bandung line in Tegalluar, Indonesia’s West Java province, last month. The railway had planned to begin a free trial with passengers in mid-August, but this could now be pushed back. Photo Antara Foto/Raisan Al Farisi via Reuters Rome, June 6 Reuters - A Webuild-led consortium has won a tender worth billion euros $ billion to build a section of a new high-speed railway line in Sicily, the Italian construction group said on leads the consortium with a 75% stake, while Italian partner Ghella holds the remaining 25%.Under the contract, the consortium will build 30 kilometres of railway between Palermo and Catania - the two main cities in Sicily, an island that has long suffered from poor transport said the new line would cut travel times between Palermo and Catania from three hours to contract announced on Tuesday was awarded by Rete Ferroviaria Italiana RFI, part of state-controlled railways group Gruppo Ferrovie dello Stato Italiane.$1 = eurosReporting by Federica Urso, editing by Alvise Armellini and Jason NeelyOur Standards The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

high speed railway contractor consortium